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Roland Fakler

Equality

Posted by on 19. Januar 2026

The Idea of Equality: A European Intellectual History

by Roland Fakler

The idea that human beings ought to possess equal rights despite their factual inequality is one of the most significant achievements of European political thought. This principle is neither self-evident nor timeless; rather, it is the result of a long and often contradictory intellectual development marked by gradual advances, setbacks, and tensions.

Early reflections on human equality can already be found in ancient Greek philosophy. The Sophists, particularly figures such as Antiphon, challenged conventional distinctions between Greeks and non-Greeks and argued that all humans are equal by nature. In his fragment On Truth, Antiphon famously maintained that natural needs and capacities are shared by all humans, while social differences are merely conventional (Antiphon, Peri Alētheias, frag. B44 DK). This conception of equality was anthropological rather than political, but it represented an important departure from ethnocentric hierarchies.

Stoic philosophy further developed this universalist outlook. Thinkers such as Zeno of Citium, Seneca, and later Marcus Aurelius argued that all human beings participate in the logos, the universal rational principle governing the cosmos. From this followed the idea of a moral equality of all persons and the notion of a cosmopolitan human community (see Cicero, De Legibus I; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations VI.44). However, Stoic equality remained fundamentally ethical and internal; it did not translate into a rejection of political hierarchies or institutions such as slavery.

A remarkable exception within ancient philosophy is Epicurus. In his Garden, women, slaves, and free men were admitted on equal terms, an inclusion highly unusual for the time (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, X). Although Epicureanism did not advocate political equality, it embodied a practical recognition of human equal worth within a philosophical community, anticipating later egalitarian intuitions.

Roman philosophy inherited much of the Stoic framework. Seneca, for example, explicitly acknowledged the humanity and moral dignity of slaves (Epistulae Morales, 47). Yet he did not question the legitimacy of slavery as an institution. Here again, moral equality did not entail equal legal or political rights.

Christianity introduced a new dimension to the concept of equality by proclaiming the spiritual equality of all human beings before God. Passages such as Galatians 3:28 (“There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female”) express this theological universalism. However, this spiritual equality excludes non-believers; it coexisted with social conservatism. In several Pauline letters, existing hierarchies are affirmed: women are urged to submit, and slaves are instructed to obey their masters (e.g., 1 Corinthians 14:34–35; Ephesians 6:5). As a result, early Christianity tended to reinforce rather than dismantle social inequality.

Medieval scholasticism preserved this ambivalence. Thomas Aquinas grounded human dignity in the shared rational nature of all persons (Summa Theologiae, I–II, q.94), yet he defended hierarchical social structures, legitimised coercion against heretics, and accepted religious intolerance as compatible with the common good (Summa Theologiae, II–II, q.11). Equality remained metaphysical, not juridical.

The Reformation did not produce a decisive breakthrough either. Martin Luther’s doctrine of obedience to worldly authority (Von weltlicher Obrigkeit) and his virulent anti-Jewish writings (Von den Juden und ihren Lügen) stand in clear tension with modern notions of equality. Similarly, John Calvin’s theocratic governance in Geneva tolerated little religious dissent. Religious reform thus coincided with new forms of exclusion and confessional rigidity.

A genuine turning point emerges only with the Enlightenment. Early modern political philosophers articulated a secular foundation for equal rights. Thomas Hobbes derived equality from the shared vulnerability of human beings in the state of nature (Leviathan, ch. 13). John Locke grounded equality in natural rights possessed by all individuals (Second Treatise of Government, §§4–6). Jean-Jacques Rousseau located equality in political self-legislation through the social contract (Du contrat social, I.6). Voltaire championed religious tolerance (Traité sur la tolérance), while David Hume advanced a form of moral universalism grounded in shared human sentiments (An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals).

Here, for the first time, the idea of equal rights independent of talent, status, religion, or gender takes systematic form. Enlightenment thinkers recognised a crucial distinction: human beings are not equal in their abilities, virtues, or achievements, but they must be equal before the law. This legal equality becomes the foundation of social peace, political legitimacy, and individual freedom.

From this perspective, criticism of ideologies that institutionalise legal inequality is both legitimate and necessary. Such criticism need not be directed at individuals, but at normative systems. It is therefore possible to respect Muslims as persons while critically examining elements of classical Islamic doctrine that assign unequal legal status to women or non-Muslims (e.g., dhimmi regulations in classical fiqh; see quran). The same critical standard applies to any religious or secular doctrine.

Equal rights are not a natural given; they are a fragile intellectual and political achievement of the Enlightenment. Their preservation requires continuous philosophical reflection and moral vigilance.

Selected Sources (Primary and Secondary)

Ancient and Medieval

Early Modern / Enlightenment

Modern Secondary Literature